# DISTRIBUTION OF AN IMITATION CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCE

(N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11)

Count of the indictment charges the defendant as follows:
(Read indictment)
The pertinent part of the statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11) on which this indictment is based
reads as follows:
<ul> <li>a. It is unlawful for any person to distribute any substance which is not a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog:</li> </ul>
[Read Appropriate Section or Sections of the Statute] <sup>1</sup>
(1) Upon the express or implied representation to the recipient that the substance is a controlled dangerous substance [or controlled substance analog]; or
(2) Upon the express or implied representation to the recipient that the substance is of such nature, appearance or effect that the recipient will be able to distribute or use the substance as a controlled dangerous substance [or controlled substance analog]; or
(3) Upon circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the substance is a controlled dangerous substance [or controlled substance analog].
The statute, read together with the indictment, identifies the elements which the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to establish guilt of the defendant on this (count of the) indictment.
They are as follows:
S in evidence is not a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog.
The statute provides that this offense may be committed in three ways; that is by representation that the

substance is a CDS, by representation that the substance can be used or distributed as a CDS, and under circumstances under which a reasonable person would believe the substance to be a CDS. The

circumstances of the case will determine which one (or more) of these sections should be charged.

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2.	That either:  A. The defendant made an expressed or implied representation to the recipient that S in evidence is a controlled dangerous substance, specifically (e.g. cocaine)
	or
	B. The defendant made an expressed or implied representation to the recipient that S in evidence is of such nature, appearance or effect that the recipient will be able to distribute or use S in evidence as a controlled dangerous substance, specifically (e.g., cocaine)
	or
	C. The defendant possessed or had under his control with intent to distribute S in evidence under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the substance is a controlled dangerous substance, specifically (e.g., cocaine).
3.	The defendant distributed S in evidence.
4.	The defendant, acted knowingly in distributing S in evidence. <sup>2</sup>
dangerous substance defined in another per chemical structure subspecifically designed substance. You have the substance, up to you that	ated, the first element is that S in evidence is not a controlled or controlled substance analog. Controlled dangerous substances are art of our law. A controlled substance analog is a substance that (1) has a substantially similar to that of a controlled dangerous substance and (2) was a to produce an effect substantially similar to that of a controlled dangerous e heard testimony in this case that S in evidence is  To you to determine whether this testimony is credible. However, I instruct is not a controlled dangerous substance. You have also heard testimony is not a controlled substance analog in that it would not produce an effect
purposefully di	s not specify a mental element. (Compare <u>N.J.S.A</u> . 2C:35-5 which specifies a knowingly or stribution of CDS.) Nonetheless, in light of <u>N.J.S.A</u> . 2C:2-2c(3) it would seem that a ution is required.
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-	2.

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substantially similar to that of a controlled dangerous substance and that it was not specifically designed to produce such an effect. Again, it is solely up to you to determine whether this testimony is credible.

In regard to the second element, as I have instructed you, you must decide whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt [charge appropriate section or sections]: That either: Α. The defendant made an expressed or implied representation to the recipient that S \_\_\_\_\_ in evidence is a controlled dangerous substance, specifically (e.g. cocaine) or В. The defendant made an expressed or implied representation to the recipient that S \_\_\_\_\_ in evidence is of such nature, appearance or effect that the recipient will be able to distribute or use S \_\_\_\_\_ in evidence as a controlled dangerous substance, specifically (e.g., cocaine) C. The defendant possessed or had under his control with intent to distribute S \_\_\_\_\_ in evidence under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the substance is a controlled dangerous substance, specifically (e.g., cocaine). In determining whether the circumstances were such as to lead a reasonable person to believe that S \_\_\_\_\_ is a controlled dangerous substance, specifically (e.g., cocaine), you should of course consider all the evidence including whether S \_\_\_\_\_ was packaged in a manner normally used for the unlawful distribution of controlled dangerous substances; whether any distribution or attempted distribution of S \_\_\_\_\_ was accompanied by an exchange of or demand for money or other thing as consideration for S \_\_\_\_\_ and the value of the consideration exceeded the reasonable value of S \_\_\_\_\_\_; and whether the physical appearance of S \_\_\_\_\_ is substantially the same as that of a specific controlled dangerous substance.]<sup>4</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> <u>N.J.S.A.</u> 2C:35-11a(3)(a) through (c). This language only should be charged when the third alternative is applicable.

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[Note: When it is charged that the substance is an imitation of a controlled dangerous substance <u>analog</u>, the following charge, rather than the one set forth above, should be given as the instruction on the second element of the offense.]

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controlled substance analog.]<sup>5</sup>

In regard to the third element, that the defendant distributed S \_\_\_\_\_ in evidence, to "distribute" means the transfer, actual, constructive or attempted, from one person to another of a controlled dangerous substance (or controlled substance analog). It is not necessary that the drugs be transferred in exchange for payment or promise of payment of money or anything of value.

In regard to the fourth element, the State must prove, as I have stated, that the defendant acted knowingly in distributing S\_\_\_\_\_.

A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of (his/her) conduct or the attendant circumstances if (he/she) is aware that (his/her) conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or (he/she) is aware of a high probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of (his/her) conduct if (he/she) is aware that it is practically certain that (his/her) conduct will cause such a result. "Knowing," "with knowledge" or equivalent terms have the same meaning.<sup>8</sup>

Remember that when we speak of knowingly, we are speaking of a condition of the mind that cannot be seen. It is not necessary for the State to prove the existence of such mental state by direct evidence such as a statement by the defendant that (he/she) had particular knowledge. Knowledge as a separate proposition of proof does not commonly exist. It must ordinarily be discovered as other mental states are from circumstantial evidence; that is, by reference to the defendant's conduct, words or acts and all the surrounding circumstances.

It should be noted that the law provides that it shall not be a defense that the defendant mistakenly believed a substance to be a controlled dangerous substance [or controlled substance analog.] Thus, if you were to find that the defendant acted knowingly in distributing S \_\_\_\_\_ in evidence but mistakenly believed that S \_\_\_\_\_ in evidence was a controlled dangerous substance [or controlled substance analog], as opposed to an imitation controlled dangerous

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11a(3)(a) through (c). This language should only be charged when the third alternative is applicable.

This definition is taken from the definitions of "distribute" and "deliver" set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> State v. Heitzman, 209 N.J.Super. 617, 621 (App. Div. 1986), aff'd 107 N.J. 603 (1987).

<sup>8</sup> N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(1).

<sup>9 &</sup>lt;u>N.J.S.A</u>. 2C:35-11c.

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substance [or	imitation	on controlled substance analog], the defendant's mistaken belief as to the
character of S		evidence would not prevent you from finding that the defendant
acted knowing	gly in di	istributing S in evidence.
To reit	terate, tl	he four elements of this offense are that
	1.	S in evidence is not a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog.
	2.	A. The defendant made an expressed or implied representation to the recipient that S in evidence is a controlled dangerous substance, specifically (e.g. cocaine)
		or
		B. The defendant made an expressed or implied representation to the recipient that S in evidence is of such nature, appearance or effect that the recipient will be able to distribute or use S in evidence as a controlled dangerous substance, specifically (e.g., cocaine)  or
		C. The defendant possessed or had under his control with intent to distribute S in evidence under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the substance is a controlled dangerous substance, specifically (e.g., cocaine).
	3.	The defendant distributed S in evidence.
	4.	The defendant acted knowingly in distributing S in evidence.
If you	find th	at the State had proven all these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must retu	rn a ve	rdict of guilty. On the other hand, if you find the State has failed to prove

any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must return a verdict of not guilty.