## AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - SIGNIFICANT BODILY INJURY N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7)<sup>1</sup>

In Count	of the Indictment, the def	endant(s) is (ar	re) charged v	vith the crime of
aggravated assault in that he/she/they allegedly on _		in	n the	
	, c ,	(Date)	_	(Municipality)

#### (READ PERTINENT LANGUAGE OF INDICTMENT)

The defendant(s) is (are) accused of violating a section of our State statutes that reads as follows:

A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he . . . [a]ttempts to cause significant bodily injury to another or causes significant bodily injury purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such significant bodily injury.

# OPTION ONE<sup>2</sup> (Causing Significant Bodily Injury)

To find the defendant(s) guilty of aggravated assault for causing significant bodily injury to another, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:

- 1. That the defendant(s) caused significant bodily injury to another; and
- 2. That the defendant(s) acted purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly.

## (If Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result is <u>Not</u> an Issue, Charge the Following)

Whether the aggravated assault is committed purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, causing significant bodily injury must be within the design or contemplation of the defendant.

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7) took effect on January 5, 1996.

Options One and Two of this model charge are not mutually exclusive and, therefore, it may be appropriate to charge the jury as to both respective theories — that is, causing <u>and</u> attempting to cause significant bodily injury — depending on the nature of the Indictment and the evidence adduced at trial.

(If Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result is an Issue, **Charge the Following)** 

Causation<sup>3</sup> has a special meaning under the law. To establish causation, the State must

prove two elements, each beyond a reasonable doubt: First, but for the defendant's (defendants')

conduct, the result in question would not have happened. In other words, without defendant's

(defendants') actions the result would not have occurred.

(When purposeful or knowing conduct involved)

Second, the actual result must have been within the design or contemplation of the defendant(s).

If not, it must involve the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated, and

must also not be too remote, too accidental in its occurrence or too dependent on another's

volitional act to have a just bearing on the defendant's (defendants') liability or on the gravity of

his/her/their offense.

(When reckless conduct involved)

Second, [for reckless conduct] that the actual result must have been within the risk of which the

defendant(s) was (were) aware. If not, it must involve the same kind of injury or harm as the

probable result and must also not be too remote, too accidental in its occurrence or too dependent

on another's volitional act to have a just bearing on the defendant's (defendants') liability or on

the gravity of his/her/their offense.

(CHARGE IN ALL CASES)

Significant bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a temporary loss of the

function of any bodily member or organ or temporary loss of any one of the five senses.<sup>4</sup> As you

know, the five senses are sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell. Bodily injury means physical

pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition.<sup>5</sup>

The second element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the

N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3.

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(d).

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(a).

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defendant(s) acted purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme

indifference to the value of human life recklessly.

A person acts purposely with respect to the result of his/her conduct if it is his/her

conscious object to cause such a result. A person acts purposely if he/she acts with design, with

a specific intent, with a particular object or purpose, or if he/she means to do what he/she does.

A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his/her conduct or the attendant

circumstances if he/she is aware that his/her conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances

exist or if he/she is aware of a high probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly with

respect to the result of his/her conduct if he/she is aware that it is practically certain that his/her

conduct will cause such a result.

A person acts recklessly with respect to the result of his/her conduct if he/she consciously

disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur from his/her conduct. The

risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's

conduct and the circumstances known to the actor, its disregard involves a gross deviation from

the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. One is

said to act recklessly if one acts with recklessness, with scorn for the consequences, heedlessly,

fool-hardily.

The phrase "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human

life" does not focus on the state of mind of the actor, but rather on the circumstances under

which you find that he/she acted. If, in light of all the evidence, you find that the conduct of the

defendant(s) resulted in a probability as opposed to a mere possibility of significant bodily

injury, then you may find that he/she/they acted under circumstances manifesting extreme

indifference to the value of human life.<sup>6</sup>

In <u>State v. Curtis</u>, 195 N.J. Super. 354, 364–65 (App. Div.), <u>certif. denied</u>, 99 N.J. 212 (1984), the

court found, in the context of aggravated manslaughter, that the difference between recklessness under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life and mere recklessness is the difference

between the probability as opposed to the possibility that a certain result will occur. The Supreme Court

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In determining whether the defendant(s) acted purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly, you may consider the nature of the act(s) itself (themselves) and the severity of the resulting injury (injuries).

Purpose, knowing and reckless are conditions of the mind that cannot be seen and can only be determined by inferences drawn from the defendant's (defendants') conduct, words or acts. A state of mind is rarely susceptible of direct proof but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts. Therefore, it is not necessary that the State produce witnesses to testify that an accused said that he/she had a certain state of mind when he/she engaged in a particular act. It is within your power to find that such proof has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inference, which may arise from the nature of the defendant's (defendants') acts and conduct, from all that he/she/they said and did at the particular time and place, and from all surrounding circumstances.

(**NOTE:** When the actual victim is one other than the intended victim, the jury should be instructed that it is immaterial that the actual victim was not the intended victim).

#### (CHARGE IN ALL CASES)

All jurors do not have to agree unanimously concerning which form of aggravated assault is present so long as all believe that it was one form of aggravated assault or the other. However, to be guilty of aggravated assault, all jurors must agree that the defendant(s) either knowingly or purposely or recklessly caused significant bodily injury to [insert victim's name].

If you find that the State has proved each element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant(s) guilty.

endorsed <u>Curtis</u> in <u>State v. Breakiron</u>, 108 N.J. 591, 605 (1987). The case law has applied the <u>Curtis</u> probability standard to the aggravated-assault statute. <u>State v. Scher</u>, 278 N.J. Super. 249, 272 (App. Div. 1994), <u>certif. denied</u>, 140 N.J. 276 (1995); <u>State v. Oriole</u>, 243 N.J. Super. 688, 693 (Law Div. 1990). Please note that in the aggravated-assault statute the Legislature has used the term "extreme indifference to the value of human life," while the aggravated-manslaughter statute speaks in terms of "extreme indifference to human life." Therefore, the indifference referred to in the aggravated-assault statute would appear not to relate to whether the victim lives or dies but rather to the value of the victim's life.

If you find that the State has failed to prove any element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant(s) not guilty.

## **OPTION TWO**(Attempt to Cause Significant Bodily Injury)

To find the defendant(s) guilty of attempting to cause significant bodily injury to another, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant(s) purposely<sup>7</sup> attempted to cause significant bodily injury to another. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant(s) attempted to cause significant bodily injury, it does not matter whether such injury actually resulted.

The law provides that a person is guilty of attempt if, acting purposefully, he/she:

#### (CHOOSE AS APPROPRIATE)

1. Engaged in conduct that would constitute the offense if the attendant circumstances were as a reasonable person would believe them to be;

(or)

2. Did (or omitted to do) anything with the purpose of causing significant bodily injury to another without further conduct on his/her part. This means that the defendant(s) did something designed to cause significant bodily injury without having to take any further action.

(or)

3. Did (or omitted to do) anything that, under the circumstances as a reasonable person would believe them to be, was an act (or omission) constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. The step taken must be one that is

When a person actually causes significant bodily injury, "he is guilty whether his mental state is purposeful, knowing or reckless. However, where the person does not cause serious bodily injury but only attempts to do so, he is guilty only if the attempt to cause that result is purposeful." <u>State v. McAllister</u>, 211 N.J. Super. 355, 362 (App. Div. 1986) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a); <u>State v. Battle</u>, 209 N.J. Super. 255, 258-59 (App. Div. 1986)).

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strongly corroborative of the defendant's criminal purpose. The accused must be shown to have

had a firmness of criminal purpose in light of the step(s) he/she had already taken. These

preparatory steps must be substantial and not just very remote preparatory acts.<sup>8</sup>

A person acts purposely with respect to the result of his conduct if it is his/her conscious

object to cause such a result. A person acts purposely if he/she acts with design, with a specific

intent, with a particular object or purpose, or if he/she means to do what he/she does.

In determining whether the defendant(s) acted purposely, you may consider the nature of

the act(s) itself (themselves) and the severity of the resulting injury (injuries).

Purpose is a condition of the mind that cannot be seen and can only be determined by

inferences drawn from the defendant's (defendants') conduct, words or acts. A state of mind is

rarely susceptible of direct proof but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts. Therefore, it is

not necessary that the State produce witnesses to testify that an accused said that he/she had a

certain state of mind when he/she engaged in a particular act. It is within your power to find that

such proof has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inference, which may arise from the

nature of the defendant's (defendants') acts and conduct, from all that he/she/they said and did at

the particular time and place, and from all surrounding circumstances.

(CHARGE IN ALL CASES)

Significant bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a temporary loss of the

function of any bodily member or organ or temporary loss of any one of the five senses.<sup>9</sup> As you

know, the five senses are sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell. Bodily injury means physical

pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition. <sup>10</sup>

If you find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant(s)

purposely attempted to cause significant bodily injury to another, then you must find the

State v. Fornino, 223 N.J. Super. 531, 538 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 570 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 859, 109 S. Ct. 152, 102 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1988).

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(d).

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(a).

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defendant(s) guilty. 11

If you find that the State has failed to prove any element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant(s) not guilty. 12

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Where appropriate, renunciation should be charged. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(d).

In third-degree aggravated assault cases involving the use of a deadly weapon, it may be appropriate to instruct the jury on the following lesser offenses: fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(3); and simple assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1) and (2). Cf. State v. Villar, 292 N.J. Super. 320, 326–30 (App. Div. 1996), rev'd. o.g., 150 N.J. 503, 517 n.4 (1997). See also State v. Sloane, 111 N.J. 293, 301 (1988). These may be charged as lesser offenses even though fourth-degree aggravated assault and (a)(2) disorderly persons simple assault contain an element (a deadly weapon) that is not an element of third-degree aggravated assault. Cf. Villar, 150 N.J. at 517; Sloane, 111 N.J. at 293. When these lesser offenses are to be charged, the trial court and counsel should construct a sequence of the lesser offenses to be charged. Villar, 150 N.J. at 517 n.4.